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In northern Europe, youth 
demonstrations and riots have 
recurred during the last three 
decades. During the late 2000s, 
social unrest spread mostly in 
southern European countries but 
also, more surprisingly, in the UK. 
France
During the 1960s and 1970s, 
educated youth in European  
societies were at the forefront of 
protests and demonstrations. In 
France and in Italy, educated youth 
were able, to a certain extent, 
to mobilize a segment of their 
uneducated peers under a Marxist 
discourse of common long-term 
interests. From the mid-eighties, 
immigrant youth were able to rally 
Leftist parties to their cause. This 
unity came to an end in the 1990s 
when Leftist parties, at the time in 
power, began to fear the reaction 
of the indigenous lower class. 
Immigrant youth were ignored, while 
the mainstream political parties 
were able to co-opt a portion of the 
Maghrebian elite. In the meantime, 
another cohort of North African 
immigrants’ sons took over the streets 
and the suburban poor areas. 
A large episode of social unrest 
took place in France in autumn 
2005, and a smaller one in 2007. In 
2005, for three weeks, more than 
200 cities and 300 boroughs were a 
theatre of violence against the 
police; more than 10,000 cars 
burned. The participants of the riots 
were mainly youth of African 
ancestry; for the ﬁrst time in recent 
French history, youth whose family 
came from Sahel Africa were 
overrepresented. Adolescents 
belonging to large families, living in 
areas where close to 50 per cent of 
the population is under 25 years-old, 
dominated the 2005 riots. 
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Economic segregation, more than 
unemployment itself, played an 
important role in France: the riots, 
even in provincial cities, were much 
more likely to occur where the 
segregation indices of immigrants 
were relatively high. The separation 
of communities on an ethno-cultural 
basis is very sharp in two-dozen 
cities in the Paris metropolis and 
several provincial cities and towns. 
But in many more places where 
segregation levels are lower, youth 
nevertheless feel resentful that they 
inhabit ‘African’ cities remote from 
wealthy ’European’ centres. 
Over the last 15 years, French 
high-school students have also 
participated in demonstrations and 
protest movements, but of a different 
nature. Worried about their future, 
the educated youth have been 
involved in a wide range of actions 
against underpaid work contracts. 
During these years, rioters in poor 
immigrant districts were treated with 
indifference by educated youth; 
conversely, unskilled youth living in 
suburban public housing estates 
stayed put when faced with the 
student demonstrations: they did not 
join them in the streets. Since 2000, 
many school dropouts, coming from 
the poor suburbs, have systematically 
entered the student demonstrations 
to beat the students when the 
demonstration ended, sometimes 
looting nearby shops. 
In the context of the 
fragmentation of youth and violence, 
neither the wave of riots of the 1990s 
nor that of the 2000s has had any 
important institutional or political 
outlet. In 2005, rioters did not make 
explicit claims, they did not have 
banners expressing their wishes or 
requests, leaders and spokesmen 
were absent. They demanded 
implicitly protection and 
consideration from the State, which 
did not come. After a short interest in 
elections issues, it became obvious 
that the voter turnout rates of young 
adults in poor urban districts would 
remain among the lowest. This 
political alienation did not contribute 
to any signiﬁcant change in the 
political landscape. The divorce 
between the student movement and 
that of young people from the poor 
suburbs has become absolute, such 
that it is difﬁcult to conceive of 
uniﬁed youth movements and protest 
actions in France. The split expresses 
evidence of deeper differences that 
lie at the root of socio-political 
divergences.
Britain
In the UK, throughout the end of 
the twentieth century, many cultural 
protests, in which music and drug 
consumption played an important 
role, had also a political dimension. 
If, in the UK, it has always been 
difﬁcult to cut across class barriers, 
interethnic fragmentation was not 
marked in the waves of riots in the 
1980s. These riots had a strong 
immigrant component: unrest in 
Brixton, Manchester and Birmingham 
involved youth of different origins, 
but at that time, Asian and Caribbean 
youth usually fought together against 
the police. The deindustrialisation 
process had not yet begun; unions 
were still strong and able to bridge 
the divides between ethnic groups. 
Waves of riots in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s in several Northern 
and Midlands cities revealed the 
effect of deindustrialisation in areas 
inhabited by immigrants of the New 
Commonwealth. The clashes 
involved conﬂicts between 
immigrant youth of various ancestries 
which has been attributed to deep 
ethnic segregation and a conception 
of multiculturalism that leads each 
ethnic group to form a separate 
world. The Cantle Report (2006), 
strongly advocated a return to 
assimilation policies. In fact, this 
proved difﬁcult, as we saw a few 
years later in Lozells, Birmingham. 
The economic forces underlying the 
2005 Lozells riots seemed 
emblematic of a recurrent situation; 
in spite of an effort to improve 
intercommunity relations, ethnic 
tensions remained clear in the youth 
protests at the end of the decade. 
In December 2010, British 
students organised large rallies 
against university fee hikes. By 
August, 2011, riots had broken-out 
in mixed districts in North East 
London and, to a 
lesser extent, in 
South London, 
and to major 
cities in the 
Midlands and 
North West of 
England. They led 
to a full week of 
riots, a great loss 
of property, and 
the death of ﬁve 
people; symptomatically three 
victims belonged to the Asian 
community. Black and White youth 
from working class backgrounds who 
demonstrated in the UK last summer 
were heavily involved in arson, 
looting and vandalism. 
Apart from a few exceptional 
cases, young men of South Asian 
origin were not among the rioters. 
Economic unrest, buoyed by 
resentment toward the wealthy, but 
often targeting the underprivileged 
Asian immigrants, is conspicuous. 
Those who participated seemed to 
come in high proportion from 
families stricken with rising youth 
unemployment and the 
dismemberment of social 
programmes. The shops looted were 
not random; the most violent 
encounters involved Asian youth 
protecting their community shops, 
but ‘looting’ in Salford was in a 
predominantly White 
neighbourhood, and there were 
indications of defensive vigilantism 
amongst the Far Right groups. 
Comparison
Despite important common 
points, these two countries show 
striking contrasts in the nature 
of their protests. In the UK, the 
rioters were not youth with direct 
African ancestry, nor Pakistani or 
Bangladeshi, but rather youth of 
Black Caribbean ancestry or native 
Britons from the lower rung of the 
social ladder, with disproportionately 
high unemployment rates. In the 
London metropolitan area and in the 
UK more generally, the 2011 riots 
did not take place in all poverty-
stricken areas. The rioters were 
not youth of Muslim ancestry, but 
underclass young men from different 
backgrounds. In London, rioters lived 
close to the city centre in relatively 
disadvantaged 
areas surrounded 
by very wealthy 
boroughs (Butler 
and Hamnett, 
2011), which 
seems to have 
been the case for 
riot areas in the 
Midlands. In the 
UK riots in 2011, 
as in the 1990s 
and 2000s, there was a split in terms 
of class and ethnicity; conspicuously, 
the sons of Asian immigrants were 
not at the forefront of the riots, but 
rather were more often targets, 
as they defended their recently 
acquired property. 
In France, the 2005 riots were 
numerous in the capital region and 
in cities of the industrial east and 
southeast; like in the UK, poor 
uneducated youth from immigrant 
ancestry clashed with middle class 
youth. But there was little interethnic 
strife among minorities. In France, an 
overwhelming proportion of rioters 
came from the local French 
underclass or from families that had 
immigrated from North Africa and 
Sahel Africa.?The rioters lived in 
public housing estates located in 
remote poor suburbs of big cities or 
in segregated towns. Even if Islam as 
such did not play a major role, the 
over-reaction of the rioters when a 
teargas-can exploded along a 
mosque wall in November 2005 
reveals that religion constitutes a 
hypersensitive point. 
Rich areas and observers
In the UK, areas involved in 
2011 riots were poor but in close 
vicinity of rich areas and observers 
have suggested that a factor of 
intensiﬁcation in the conﬂicts was 
the confrontation of opposite parts 
of the social spectrum. In France 
empirical evidence shows that 
social and ethnic segregation at a 
larger scale between old ‘bourgeois 
centre’ and remote peripheries 
has contributed to heighten the 
probability of unrest. In the UK, 
beyond the youth/senior divide, there 
is an unemployment gap between 
immigrants and nationals that varies 
geographically. In high immigration 
areas, the employment rate of non 
UK-born people is noticeably seven 
percentage points lower than in areas 
with low numbers of immigrants, 
where the gap between non UK-born 
and UK-born people is slight. 
It seems that the 2011 incidents 
often took place in disadvantaged 
areas where non-UK born citizens 
have lower employment rates. 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis of very 
modest ancestry have slightly better 
school achievement records on 
average than those of Caribbean and 
native British youth. The propensity 
of engaging in riots also seems to be 
linked to the prospects of the entire 
immigrant group; the prospect of 
South Asian immigrants differ in this 
respect from that of the Caribbean 
and British underclass. ?
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Employment data are from the Economic 
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